The shared socialist ideal is the defining character of China-DPRK relations. The Communist Party of China and the Workers' Party of Korea are both Marxist ruling parties, and China and the DPRK are fellow travelers on the socialist road. I firmly believe that as the two parties and two countries join hands to push forward each side's party and state cause and continue to strengthen pragmatic exchanges and cooperation, this will powerfully promote national prosperity and strength and the happiness and well-being of the people, and will continuously demonstrate the marked advantages and bright prospects of socialism. - From Xi's signed article in DPRK media

Today’s top items:

1. Xi in North Korea - Xi Jinping is in North Korea on his first trip to the country in seven years. According to the Xinhua readout (translation) of Xi’s meeting with Kim Jong Un Monday, Xi articulated four points for developing PRC-DPRK relations:

First, persist in taking high-level exchanges as the guide and consolidate the foundations of political mutual trust. Strategic guidance by the top leaders is the greatest strength of China-DPRK relations. I am willing to maintain close strategic communication with General Secretary Kim and lead China-DPRK relations continually to new heights. This year marks the 65th anniversary of the signing of the China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and the two sides should hold solemn commemorative activities. The party-to-party relationship plays an important guiding role in the development of China-DPRK relations. The two parties should further expand and enliven friendly exchanges at all levels and in all fields, and deepen exchanges and mutual learning on the experience of governing party and country. The two sides should strengthen exchanges in diplomacy, law enforcement, the armed forces, and other areas, and properly implement the important consensus reached between General Secretary Kim and me, so as to pool wisdom and strength for the development of China-DPRK relations.

第一，坚持以高层交往为引领，夯实政治互信根基。最高领导人战略引领是中朝关系的最大优势。我愿同总书记同志保持密切战略沟通，引领中朝关系不断迈向新高度。今年是《中朝友好合作互助条约》签订65周年，双方要隆重举办纪念活动。两党关系对中朝关系发展发挥重要引领作用，要进一步拓展和活跃两党各层级各领域友好交往，深化治党治国经验交流互鉴。双方要加强外交、执法、军队等交流，落实好我和总书记同志达成的重要共识，为中朝关系发展汇聚智慧和力量。

Second, persist in taking the well-being of the people as the goal and raise the level of practical cooperation. The Chinese side is willing to strengthen the alignment of development strategies with the DPRK, expand practical cooperation in trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, health care, and other areas, and better benefit the peoples of both countries. The two sides should take the full reopening of border ports of entry and the resumption of civil aviation flights and international passenger rail services as an opportunity to expand people-to-people exchanges and bring about a two-way flow.

第二，坚持以为民造福为目标，提升务实合作水平。中方愿同朝方加强发展战略对接，扩大经贸、农业、建筑、科技、医疗卫生等务实合作，更好造福两国人民。双方要以边境口岸全面复通、民航航班和国际客运列车恢复运营为契机，扩大人员往来，实现双向奔赴。

Third, persist in taking the passing-on of friendship as a driving force and tighten the bonds of people-to-people affinity. The traditional friendship between China and the DPRK, forged in blood, is a precious common treasure of the two peoples. The Chinese side is willing to work with the DPRK side to properly maintain and manage the memorial facilities for Chinese People’s Volunteer Army martyrs in the DPRK, carry out revolutionary-tradition education and ideological education for young people with distinctive characteristics, and pass on the two countries’ red genes and traditional friendship. China is willing to work with the DPRK to make good use of each side’s strengths and resources to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in education, the arts, tourism, sports, media, youth, sub-national, and sister-city ties, so that the traditional China-DPRK friendship takes deeper root in the people’s hearts.

第三，坚持以友谊传承为动力，拉紧民心相通纽带。中朝用鲜血凝成的传统友谊是两国人民共同的宝贵财富。中方愿同朝方一道，共同维护好、管理好在朝志愿军烈士纪念设施，开展富有特色的革命传统教育、青少年思想教育，传承好两国红色基因和传统友谊。中方愿同朝方用好各自优势资源，加强教育、文艺、旅游、体育、媒体、青年、地方、友城等交流合作，让中朝传统友谊更加深入人心。

Fourth, persist in taking fairness and justice as the guiding concept and enrich the substance of strategic coordination. In response to the major question of where humanity is headed, I put forward the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind and the four major global initiatives, hoping to push global governance to develop in a more just and reasonable direction; this has won broad support and a positive response from the international community, including the DPRK side. Asia is the home in which China, the DPRK, and other regional countries live and earn their livelihoods. China and the DPRK should strengthen strategic coordination and cooperation, firmly defend their respective sovereignty, security, and development interests, and jointly safeguard peace and development in the region.

第四，坚持以公平正义为理念，丰富战略协作内涵。面对人类向何处去这一重大课题，我提出构建人类命运共同体理念和四大全球倡议，希望推动全球治理朝着更加公正合理的方向发展，得到包括朝方在内的国际社会广泛支持和积极响应。亚洲是中朝等地区国家的安身立命之所。中朝两国应加强战略协调和配合，坚定捍卫各自主权、安全、发展利益，共同维护地区和平与发展。

Xi made no mention of denuclearization, a hopeless endeavor at this point.

Minister of Defense Dong Jun is part of Xi’s delegation. I do not believe Xi’s 2019 delegation included the Minister of Defense.

Much of the commentary around this visit talks about how Xi is concerned about North Korea’s closer ties with Russia as Kim has supported Putin in his war with Ukraine. Is there any chance though that Xi is not completely unhappy with that support, given how much he does not want to see Putin lose, and in fact now that Ukraine has regained the initiative there may be some urgency in giving Russia more support?

The June 9 People’s Daily page 1 is all Xi and Kim:

2. Li Qiang on future industries - Last week was a big week for prioritizing developing future industries, starting with the June 1 issue of Qiushi, discussed here in Sinocism. On Friday, the weekly State Council Executive meeting had as one of its agenda items studying work on future industry development, and included a warning on “blindly following trends”. From the readout:

The meeting noted that, in light of the characteristics of future industries, forward-looking layout must be further strengthened, the intensity of advancement must be increased, and the initiative in development must be firmly grasped. The technological foundation must be made solid, investment in basic research must be continuously increased, and tackling of original and disruptive technologies must be systematically arranged. Ecosystem-building must be emphasized, the deep integration of industry, academia, research, and application must be promoted, close cooperation between the upstream and downstream of industrial chains must be encouraged, and more startups and unicorn enterprises must be cultivated in key tracks. Support policies must be improved, the guiding role of government investment funds and the like must be brought into play, and mechanisms for investment growth and risk-sharing must be established. Scientific and reasonable layout must be guided, regulatory governance must be improved, and rushing in all at once and blindly following trends must be prevented.

会议指出，要根据未来产业特点，进一步加强前瞻布局、加大推动力度，牢牢把握发展主动权。要筑牢技术根基，持续增加基础研究投入，系统布局原创性、颠覆性技术攻关。要注重生态建设，推动产学研用深度融合，鼓励产业链上下游密切合作，在重点赛道培育更多初创企业和独角兽企业。要完善支持政策，发挥好政府投资基金等引导作用，建立投入增长和风险分担机制。要引导科学合理布局，完善监管治理，防止一哄而上、盲目跟风。

3. Cai Qi takes over as Central Party School President - We learned from the official report of a graduation ceremony of the Central Party School that Cai Qi is now President of the school, replacing Chen Xi, who stayed in his post far longer than expected. We have no idea why Chen was replaced now, and the move has triggered speculation of trouble for Chen. Those rumors may be true. It also makes sense that Cai now has this additional role, as the preparations for the 21st Party Congress are gearing up and the Party School is an important institution for personnel evaluation.

The timing of the announcement that Wei Xiaodong, Party Group Secretary and Chairman of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, is under investigation just as Cai Qi was taking over the Party School has caused some speculation, as Wei’s time as head of the Beijing Organization Department (April 2017 to January 2021) covered most of Cai Qi’s tenure as Beijing Party Secretary, so others have suggested one of Cai’s guys is in trouble.

I am skeptical, as if Wei is anyone’s “guy” he is more likely Chen Xi’s since Chen was head of the Central Organization Department when Wei became head of the Beijing Organization Department. We may never know, but if I had to guess, Wei’s downfall is not a problem for Cai, and Cai’s addition of the Party School title is likely another sign he will be sticking around in the 21st Party Congress as Xi’s top consigliere.

4. MSS warning on AI “transfer stations” - The Ministry of State Security on Monday published a piece on its WeChat public account titled “’AI Transfer Stations’: Guard Against the Risks” (《”AI中转站”，风险要防范》), warning that the rapidly growing market for third-party “AI transfer stations” (AI中转站) — proxy services that consolidate multiple AI model APIs onto a single platform — has produced widespread privacy leaks, the resale of user prompts to other model vendors for training, model substitution, embedded backdoors, and unauthorized cross-border data transfers. I have posted a translation here.

The MSS does not mention the most common reason Chinese users pay for these transfer stations is to reach frontier models — OpenAI, Anthropic, Google — that are blocked or unavailable through licensed PRC channels.

One of the four main appeals of the platforms, in the MSS’s own list, is “bypassing usage restrictions”:

Users can even use these stations to bypass restrictions on network access, official authorization, and cross-border transmission, connecting directly to some overseas large models.

用户甚至可以借此绕过网络访问、官方授权、跨境传输等限制，直连部分海外大模型。

On the risks, the MSS is explicit about prompt resale:

Some “AI transfer stations” lack standard data encryption and control mechanisms, and some even privately intercept user data and resell it to other large-model vendors for system training, causing user privacy leaks.

部分”AI中转站”缺乏正规数据加密与管控机制，有的甚至私自截留用户数据，倒卖给其他大模型厂商用于系统训练，造成用户隐私泄露。

And on backdoors and unauthorized data export:

Some “AI transfer stations” conceal backdoors. Bad actors may use these “backdoors” to implant malicious code on user devices, stealing account keys, cloud credentials, and the like, and may even install remote-control programs that continuously monitor user devices and steal user data.

部分”AI中转站”暗藏后门。不法分子可能通过”后门”向用户设备植入恶意代码，借此窃取账号密钥、云端凭证等，甚至植入远程控制程序，持续监控用户设备、窃取用户数据。

There are warnings in the US too about the use of these transfer stations. A recent report by the think tank CNAS - Adversarial Distillation - says they help facilitate distillation of leading US models:

Transfer stations are commercially mature intermediaries that resell unauthorized access to U.S. model APIs, routing traffic through proxy infrastructure to circumvent geographic restrictions, evade detection, and obscure the true origin of requests. They serve a broad customer base of Chinese developers, researchers, and other users seeking access to blocked U.S. models, which sustains the infrastructure that adversarial distillation campaigns exploit

So maybe this is a point of agreement for the US and PRC sides in any future AI dialogue…

5. US lists PRC tech firms as “Chinese military companies” - The US Department of War issued a revised 1260H list of “Chinese military companies” operating in the United States that added several top PRC tech firms including Alibaba, Baidu, BYD. The list was initially publicly updated in February and then quickly withdrawn as it had incorrectly removed ChangXin Memory Technologies Inc. and Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. The Trump Administration appears to have decided to withhold releasing the updated list until after the Trump-Xi summit. Inclusion on the 1260H list is more of an optics than a substantive problem for these firms, but the PRC government will not be pleased. Alibaba’s inclusion may now be a bit awkward for the NBA/WNBA and the US schools and other organizations who have taken large donations from Alibaba chairman Joe Tsai.

6. Japan’s rare earths China problem - Nikkei Asia reports that China’s expanded rare earths-related controls on exports to Japan are biting:

Based on trade data from China’s General Administration of Customs, Nikkei analyzed exports of the seven restricted rare earths, including dysprosium and terbium. Exports limits were initially imposed by the Ministry of Commerce in April 2025.

Exports of the seven rare earths for the January-April period fell 34% on the year, with steeper declines of 88% for March and 82% for April. Dysprosium and terbium, used in magnets for electric vehicle motors, saw exports fall to zero since January.

Yttrium exports for the January-April period dropped more than 90%. The rare-earth element is crucial in laser-equipped medical devices and chipmaking equipment, as well as in the aircraft and space fields.

What will the Trump Administration do when US companies start having supply issues because their Japanese suppliers can not get the rare earth supplies they need? And when will the Japanese government start retaliating?

7. Surge in EV sales exacerbating road maintenance funding stress - Yicai has a long piece on how the surging NEV fleet is breaking the tax base that pays for road upkeep, and the reforms now being discussed in response. The Ministry of Transport’s Highway Science Research Institute estimates the annual funding shortfall for ordinary public road maintenance runs around 50% nationally, with roughly 40% of ordinary roads “listed for maintenance but with no money to maintain, due for repair but with no money to repair” (列养但无钱养，应修但无钱修). On toll roads, by 2021 debt service alone was consuming 79.37% of total spending while maintenance had fallen to 5.7%, down from 9.0% in 2013, per data Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics professor Gao Lin showed Yicai.

Ordinary roads are funded mainly by transfers from the central refined-oil consumption tax — more than 80% of annual maintenance spending — but new fuel-vehicle additions collapsed from 6.01 million in 2024 to just 430,000 in 2025, and the gap will only widen.

Hainan, which has the country’s highest NEV penetration (62.9% in 2025) and abolished its toll booths decades ago in favor of a fuel surcharge, is the test case and is now piloting a BeiDou-positioning “free-flow” mileage fee. China Passenger Car Association secretary general Cui Dongshu and Fudan management school professor Ni Chenkai both told Yicai a mileage tax, possibly weight-adjusted, is the most likely path; Cui pitched a “mileage + vehicle weight + vehicle type/operating conditions” composite. Yicai also reports the relevant authorities have discussed a consumption tax on EV batteries, currently exempt.

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Earlier today I published this week’s episode of Sharp China. It is our monthly free episode, so if you like it please share with friends and colleagues. From the show notes for Seizing the Commanding Heights; Decoding Shangri-La Dialogue; Europe Moots Trade Policy; The PRC Expels a New York Times Journalist:

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with Xi Jinping's call to seize the commanding heights of science, technology, and industry across six industries of the future, as well as the State Council's move to release a 34-article law that will implicate domestic firms, foreign businesses and potentially foreign governments, as well as PRC financial institutions and individual investors. From there: Reactions to Sec…

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Show Notes:

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with Xi Jinping's call to seize the commanding heights of science, technology, and industry across six industries of the future, as well as the State Council's move to release a 34-article law that will implicate domestic firms, foreign businesses and potentially foreign governments, as well as PRC financial institutions and individual investors. From there: Reactions to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth's remarks at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, why an absence of Taiwan mentions in his main speech is not necessarily seen in Beijing as a shift in policy, and questions regarding U.S. partnerships elsewhere in the region. At the end: The looming trade tensions between Europe and China, the expulsion of New York Times journalist Vivian Wang, the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacres, and Steph Curry's new endorsement deal with Li-Ning.

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Related Readings:

New regulations on outbound investment; Qiushi on future industries; Chip export control dysfunction; Shangri-La Dialogue; EU-China -- Sinocism

Agricultural and rural modernization; Socialist political economy; UK-PRC; PRC media in Africa -- Sinocism

China Tightens Rules on Outbound Investment in Fight for Global Tech Edge -- WSJ

State Council Regulations on Outbound Investment -- Sinocism Translation

China Expands Outbound Investment Rules to Cover Individuals -- Bloomberg

Pete Hegseth says US-China ties are ‘better than in years’ -- FT

Hegseth’s Message to Asian Partners: Do More to Get More -- NYT

Japan’s defence minister Koizumi rejects China accusations of ‘new militarism’ -- FT

Brussels fires starting gun on tougher China trade policy, as Beijing vows retaliation -- SCMP

Watching China in Europe - June 2026 -- Noah Barkin

After China Orders a Times Reporter to Leave the Country, the U.S. Reciprocates -- NYT

Tiananmen Tonight Trailer -- Tiananmen Tonight

Vandals break into Tiananmen crackdown museum in US, founder says -- Hong Kong Free Press

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Today is the 37th anniversary of the June 4th crackdown on the Tiananmen. We talked about it bit on this week’s episode of Sharp China we recorded today, and especially about how well the PRC has memory-holed the events of 1989. I have nothing much new to add to what I have written before, so instead I will report what I wrote two years ago on the 35th anniversary:

Today is the 35th anniversary of June 4th. The security services are still paranoid about and cracking down on any expressions of memory of the events 35 years ago, and now in Hong Kong too. I was a student at Peking University for the 1989 Spring semester, and when classes stopped in April I got a job as a fixer for CBS News, even though my Chinese wa…

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1. 15th Five-Year Plan for Accelerating Agricultural and Rural Modernization - The State Council issued the “15th Five-Year Plan for Accelerating Agricultural and Rural Modernization,” the latest of the sectoral plans of the 15th Five-Year Plan. According to the readout, the document sets targets through 2030 with an outlook to 2035, and organizes work under seven areas. I have posted a translation here.

The “general requirements”:

Take Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as guidance; thoroughly implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the successive plenary sessions of the 20th Central Committee; conscientiously implement the arrangements of the Fourth Plenum; comprehensively implement the important expositions and instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping on “three rural” work; uphold solving the “three rural” issues as the top priority of the entire Party’s work; uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadersh…

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The burst of “positive energy” among analysts following May’s Xi-Trump summit cooled somewhat towards the end of the month. On the significance of Trump’s Taiwan remarks, more caution is expressed given both the wider institutional context in Washington and the growing military and strategic role of US regional allies, especially Japan. AI formed the second major focus, after both sides agreed to launch an intergovernmental dialogue on AI governance. Huang Ping treats this as a narrow strategic window for China to engage different US interest groups and secure a place in global AI governance and high-value industrial ecosystems—or risk being shut out for the long run.

On changes in the global order, a journal article by CICIR vice-president Zhang Jian represents the more triumphalist strand, treating the closely timed US and Russian delegation visits to Beijing as signs that China is becoming a key “connecting point” in the emerging multipolar world. Da Wei offers a more restrained formulation, merging the ideas of “G2” and multipolarity into that of a “dual-core multipolar order”. As he frames it, this both acknowledges the position of China and the US as the key players and allows middle powers the space to hedge selectively between them, avoiding the hardening of Cold War-style blocs.

Signals that the EU is considering tougher trade defences have expectedly drawn fire from Chinese analysts. The arguments are well represented by a piece from Ding Chun and Wu Jiwei, which criticises the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act’s local-content conditions while presenting Chinese-led localised production as a potential benefit to Europe, and by a CF40 report on Europe’s trade deficit with China. Outside the immediate context of EU trade, analysts are more willing to acknowledge problems with China’s trade surplus: Huang Qifan, for example, pointedly describes the current goods surplus as well beyond the sustainable range. The proposed remedies, however, remain fairly general.

The clearest fault line in the economics debate is between proponents of infrastructure-led stimulus and advocates of consumption-based stimulus. Yu Yongding, who views the post-2008 financial crisis fixed-asset stimulus as a broadly positive model, approves of signs that the Fifteenth Five-Year Plan period is set to allocate substantial funds for infrastructure outlay. On the other side, Li Xunlei argues that counter-cyclical stimulus of this kind would only deepen imbalances, while Liu Shijin suggests that money for infrastructure would be far better spent on increasing rural pensions, as he has previously advocated. Huang Yiping adds a further cautionary note: China’s past stimulus, he observes, has tended to generate a short-term inflationary boost but a longer-term deflationary effect, a pattern that AI adoption may further exacerbate.

Following a renewed official emphasis on basic research and a series of high-profile academic fraud cases at elite universities, the question of “talent” is also under scrutiny. From an official standpoint, Sun Xueyu outlines a strategy for ensuring China’s “talent security”. Wang Mingyuan, by contrast, analyses what these fraud cases reveal about deeper flaws in China’s research institutions and academic culture, while Yao Yang argues that China’s current education system is poorly designed for producing creative talent. Zheng Yongnian extends this critique to the economy: criticising the tendency of regulation and SOEs to squeeze the oxygen out of private innovation, he presents the success of motorcycle entrepreneur Zhang Xue, recently celebrated on the Chinese internet, as a model for promoting private business and recognising talent outside the mainstream education system.

— James Farquharson

1. US-China:

   1. Jia Qingguo on the limits of China-US stabilisation.

   2. Zhao Minghao on a US shift to flexible realism.

   3. Huang Ping on China’s narrowing window for diplomacy with the US on AI.

   4. Jia Min on America’s tech renaissance.

   5. Di Dongsheng & Ji Xianbai on America’s techno-industrial complex.

2. Global Order:

   1. Da Wei & Zhou Wuhua on “dual-core multipolarity” and competitive coexistence.

   2. Zhang Jian on how a more fluid multipolar order gives China greater diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

   3. Wang Wen & Ding Zhuang on gaining the initiative in cognitive warfare and conceptual autonomy.

   4. Chen Jianhong on the tributary system as China’s alternative to Western maritime and continental orders.

3. East Asia:

   1. Li Cheng on strategic patience over Taiwan and the risks of accidental escalation.

   2. Jin Canrong i) on focusing on the United States before Japan becomes a decisive obstacle to cross-Strait “reunification”; ii) on China’s Malacca dilemma and the need to avoid a “weakling mentality”.

   3. Xu Yongzhi & Duan Zhiyou on Japan’s remilitarisation and its disruptive role in East Asia.

   4. Wang Junsheng on East Asia as the central arena of Sino-US rivalry.

   5. Senior mainland scholars on post-summit Taiwan opportunities and Trump-driven uncertainty.

   6. Senior mainland scholars on cautious optimism over cross-Strait relations amid “multi-sided pressure and overlapping risks”.

4. Europe:

   1. Ding Chun & Wu Jiwei on EU industrial policy and a shift to conditional openness.

   2. Wang Jiankun & Guo Kai on Europe’s trade deficit with China.

5. Middle East & Pakistan:

   1. Hu Bo on Hormuz, maritime leverage and relative rather than absolute security.

   2. Liu Zongyi on CPEC reform, security governance and Pakistan’s development renewal.

   3. Huang Yunsong & Wang Jing on CPEC 2.0, civil-military consensus and Chinese support for Pakistan’s governance.

6. Chinese Economy:

   1. Huang Qifan on China’s trade surplus and structural adjustment.

   2. Liu Yuanchun on China’s current-account imbalances and the need for demand restructuring.

   3. Yu Yongding on why the Fifteenth Five-Year Plan is right to prioritise infrastructure stimulus.

   4. Li Xunlei on the limits of counter-cyclical stimulus.

   5. Liu Shijin on weak end-user demand as China’s growth bottleneck and why infrastructure money would be better spent on pensions.

   6. Zheng Yongnian on the need for greater social vitality to achieve entrepreneurial breakthroughs.

   7. Liu Xiaoxia & Yang Yuanyuan on the spreading phenomenon of reverse mixed-ownership reform—the injection of state capital into private enterprise.

   8. Wang Qing on national market integration and breaking invisible local protection barriers.

7. Research and Education:

   1. Wang Mingyuan on what academic corruption reveals about the pitfalls of over-metricised scholarship in China.

   2. Yao Yang on why China’s education system struggles to produce “geniuses”.

   3. Sun Xueyu on ensuring China’s “talent security”.

   4. Wen Hongyu & Hao Haiguang on the hollowing out of social life at China’s universities.

8. Tech & AI:

   1. Huang Yiping on AI and the risk of a deflationary substitution spiral.

   2. Dai Mingjie on China’s consumer-internet path dependence in AI.

   3. Zhang Zhan on converting emerging technologies into strategic and new-quality combat capability.

1. US-China

Jia Qingguo (贾庆国): Recent analysis claiming that Trump’s visit formed a “G2” pattern of US–China co-governance [中美共治], comparable to Nixon’s visit to China, is overstated — this summit advanced the relationship’s stabilisation but did not fundamentally alter its future trajectory. The outlook remains far from optimistic: structural contradictions remain acute, cooperation will be difficult and the US domestic political atmosphere remains adverse. Since Washington’s overarching goal of strategic competition with China is unchanged, relevant US government departments are still likely to roll out policies that Beijing reads as confrontational, thereby undermining the stability of the relationship. — Director, Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, Peking University (China-US Focus, 19 May)

Zhao Minghao (赵明昊): The Trump administration’s willingness to accept the new positioning of “constructive strategic stability” [建设性战略稳定] represents an important adjustment on the American side, demonstrating that flexible realism [灵活的现实主义] has become the foreign-policy principle Trump favours. On Taiwan, Trump displays new thinking, questioning the so-called Six Assurances made by the Reagan administration in 1982 and neither endorsing nor accepting Taiwan independence. However, many US members of Congress and senior officials still live in the world of 1979 and 1982, underestimating China’s resolve and capacity to defend its core interests, and should they continue to send the wrong signals to separatist forces, they could very well drag China and the United States into a war. — Deputy Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University (China-US Focus, 19 May)

Huang Ping (黄平): Chinese AI risks repeating the fate of China’s internet: formidable at home, but internationally reduced to a bounded “local-area network” [局域网] if China misses the narrowing window to enter global AI rule-making before standards, industrial ecosystems and governance frameworks harden against it. The new China–US intergovernmental AI dialogue is therefore a time-sensitive strategic opening. Its success depends on recognising that the United States is not monolithic: Trump needs visible wins, the tech right wants market access, MAGA hardliners respond more to jobs and manufacturing, the pro-Israel camp needs security reassurances over Iran, and Democrats matter for the next political cycle. China should engage each layer differently while maintaining autonomy in chips, foundation models and core algorithms. — Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, School of Public Policy, CUHK-Shenzhen (大湾区评论, 20 May)

Jia Min (贾敏): Rather than “the East rising and the West declining”, the United States is better understood as standing at the starting point of a new historical development cycle. Its “ideational founding period” [观念建国时期] of 1940–2020 has closed, and it has now entered an “AI founding period” [AI建国时期]: new technological-innovation capacity, fused with new forces of American social development, is propelling the country into a fresh cycle animated by a hardening consensus that American hegemony can be rebuilt through technological innovation. China, meanwhile, is in its own rising and rejuvenating phase, thus setting two development models against each other—China’s people-centred model, which emphasises inclusiveness and shared benefit, against an American one that exalts the individual, is market-driven and puts self-interest first. Far from having retreated from the globe, the US has instead grown more flexible, more strategically attuned and more expansionary. — Special Research Fellow, Shanghai Development Research Foundation (观察者网, 21 May)

Di Dongsheng (翟东升) & Ji Xianbai (嵇先白): America’s emerging techno-industrial complex is driving the United States to abandon free-market orthodoxy for state-led industrial policy, civil–military fusion and resistance to regulation. The digital-age heir to the military–industrial complex, it fuses big tech, the national-security state and venture capital into a single interest bloc. As the line between public power and tech capital blurs, regulatory capture intensifies: Palantir shows how government contracts, revenue and valuation can rise together. Abroad, the complex harvests “war dividends” [战争红利] across the Ukraine, Gaza and Iran conflicts, while using “small yard, high fence” containment to preserve American technological hegemony. — Di Dongsheng: Dean, Department of Area Studies; Ji Xianbai: Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (Qiushi, 1 May)

2. Global Order

Da Wei (达巍) and Zhou Wuhua (周武华): An open “dual-core multipolar” order [双核多极], in which China and the US respect each other’s security space while giving third parties room to hedge selectively between them, is essential to preventing a slide into bloc confrontation and the entrenchment of supply-chain weaponisation. The globalisation-centred post-Cold War order has given way to an international order grounded in nationalism and sovereignty-centred politics, making “competitive coexistence” the realistic basis for a new equilibrium. “Constructive strategic stability” therefore requires open multipolarity rather than strategically instrumentalising diplomatic “large triangles” [大三角] that play other powers against the rival core. — Da Wei: Professor; Zhou Wuhua: PhD candidate, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (现代国际关系研究, Issue 5, 2026)

Zhang Jian (张健): The weakening of the US-European front against China and Russia is accelerating a more genuinely multipolar China-US-Europe-Russia interaction, as China, Europe and Russia separately reduce dependence on the United States and generate a loose “collective policy effect” [集体对美的政策效应] against US hegemony. The earlier US-Europe versus China-Russia “large bilateral” [大双边] structure is dissolving, leaving Europe more exposed as it confronts Russia without reliable US support while reassessing dependence on Washington. This disaggregation has “expanded China’s room for manoeuvre, making it a connective point among the other three actors” [中国回旋空间增大，成为另外三方联结点]. The missing piece is Europe: it must drop security-driven pressure on China and pursue greater strategic autonomy from the US. — Vice-President, CICIR (现代国际关系研究, Issue 5, 2026)

Wang Wen (王文) and Ding Zhuang (丁壮): Western cognitive warfare [认知战] exploits China’s limited “conceptual autonomy”, making it vulnerable to narrative manipulation and cultural penetration. Cultural penetration promotes individualism and “historical nihilism”, including the demystification and belittling of revolutionary leaders under the banner of “humanisation”, and the distortion of major historical events in the name of “restoring historical truth”. In AI and biotechnology, Western “ethics first” [伦理前置] standards turn technical rule-setting into barriers that restrict latecomers’ application space while preserving Western flexibility through security exemptions. China must move beyond a defensive firewall and build an offensive “spear” [长矛] through agenda-setting, original concepts and cognitive sovereignty. — Wang Wen: Dean; Ding Zhuang: Associate Research Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (智库理论与实践, Issue 2, 2026)

Chen Jianhong (陈建洪): Drawing on Carl Schmitt, the modern Western order rests on two linked foundations: the continental land order, centred on territorial division and balance of power, and the Anglo-American maritime order of trade routes controlled through blockades, trade, finance and technology. China’s tributary system [朝贡秩序] offers a third order-form: like both Western orders, it contains a centre–periphery structure, but differs in combining virtue and power rather than relying on territorial partition or maritime hegemony alone. The modern competition over the Schmittian “great spaces” [大空间]—that today include regional blocs such as the EU and ASEAN as well as military or ideological functional spaces—makes this tributary model a valuable concept on which China can draw. — Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai), Sun Yat-sen University (开放时代, Issue 3, 2026)

3. East Asia

Li Cheng (李成): The recent US-China summit signalled a dramatic strategic reversal [戏剧性转变] after nearly nine years of deterioration, as Trump’s readiness to frame China through the language of friendship helped move ties away from enemy logic and opened space for “constructive strategic stability”. The more plausible trajectory is not full reconciliation or renewed Cold War, but managed competition alongside selective cooperation. A durable improvement in relations would depend on a deeper recognition that neither power can secure its interests through confrontation alone, whereas the greatest danger would be inadvertent escalation rather than planned confrontation. On Taiwan, Washington is unlikely to abandon strategic ambiguity, making crisis mismanagement, misread signals or accidental clashes [擦枪走火] across nearby seas the central risk. — Professor, University of Hong Kong (观察者网, 27 May); Note: Shanghai-born, US-educated former Brookings scholar and US citizen

Jin Canrong (金灿荣): China’s immediate strategic focus with regards to Taiwan should remain on the United States under Trump, but Japan may become a far more dangerous obstacle after 2028. First, Japan is moving from backstage involvement to open confrontation, hollowing out its pacifist constitution, expanding arms exports and joining first island chain military activity, yet it still depends heavily on US intelligence, space and strike systems. Second, if constitutional revision succeeds after the 2028 upper-house election, a fully militarised and potentially nuclear-armed Japan would greatly complicate China’s Taiwan strategy, thereby compressing the current window of opportunity [窗口期] for resolving the Taiwan issue. — Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (金金乐道, 8 May)

Jin Canrong (金灿荣): India’s growing capabilities and infrastructure push on Great Nicobar Island mean China’s Malacca difficulty is no longer centred only on the US Navy, but now includes a rising Indian challenge around a critical maritime chokepoint. China must shed its “weakling mentality” [弱者心态] and respond through concrete capabilities rather than expecting others to change their strategic perceptions. This requires three steps: continued strengthening of China’s blue-water navy, especially by expanding its aircraft-carrier fleet; developing practical bypasses through Myanmar and Thailand; and resolving the Taiwan issue to free up resources in the East and South China Seas. — Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (金金乐道, 19 May)

Xu Yongzhi (徐永智) & Duan Zhiyou (段致佑): Japan’s 2026 revision of the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment” marks a major breach in Japan’s post-war pacifist framework, further weakening constraints on lethal weapons exports and accelerating Japan’s remilitarisation. First, expanded arms sales strengthen Japan’s defence-industrial base, sustain wartime production capacity, and push the country towards becoming a regional “source of trouble” [祸源]. Second, exports to the United States, Australia, the Philippines and other partners reinforce a “grid-like” US alliance system [网格化同盟体系], deepen first-island-chain military integration, and help Japan court neighbouring states into a potential China-containment network. — Xu Yongzhi: Director, Japan Security Research Office; Duan Zhiyou: Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Northeast Asian Studies, CICIR (世界知识, Issue 10, 2026)

Wang Junsheng (王俊生): Existing studies of Sino-US rivalry overemphasise hegemony, ideology, development models and comprehensive competition while overlooking where that rivalry is geographically concentrated. East Asia — defined as Northeast and Southeast Asia, excluding Russia — is the geostrategic centre [地缘战略重心] of this contest, where the decisive struggle is not direct military confrontation but leadership over regional order. China must make East Asian order-building [东亚秩序重塑] a core diplomatic task: politically consolidating friendly states and winning over neutral ones; economically leveraging trade, Belt and Road cooperation and regional mechanisms; and strategically, addressing its security weaknesses through increased arms trade, training, exercises and dialogue with both neutral states and US-aligned countries. — Researcher and Professor, Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy, CASS (教学与研究, Issue 3, 2026)

Taiwan specialist roundtable: Senior mainland scholars broadly predict that the post-Xi-Trump meeting window could ease near-term risk around Taiwan, but not transform the structural logic of US Taiwan policy. Li Peng (李鹏) identifies Trump’s personal unpredictability as the largest variable, but argues that repeated interactions between Trump and Xi could stabilise the American president himself [稳住特朗普] and thereby support both cross-Strait stability and US-China strategic stability. Shao Yuqun (邵育群) sees a significant shift in Trump’s approach: his willingness to discuss arms sales with Beijing amounts to a partial abandonment of the “Six Assurances” [六项保证], while his refusal to endorse “Taiwan independence” [台独] adds a clearer element to strategic ambiguity [为对台战略模糊政策添加了一点清晰成分], implying non-intervention if separatism triggers conflict. Wang Hailiang (王海良) offers the most ambitious forecast, urging Beijing to use the next three years to create a positive, irreversible trend [积极的、不可逆转的态势] in China-US-Taiwan interactions and push Washington towards “informal honourable neutrality” [非正式光荣中立]. — (中评社, 24 May)

Taiwan specialist roundtable: Senior mainland scholars judge that the Taiwan Strait over the next two years should remain “broadly controllable, but under multi-sided pressure and overlapping risks” [总体可控、多面承压、风险叠加], even as “positive factors gradually increase” [积极因素渐增]. Yan Anlin (严安林) predicts new momentum for cross-Strait relations, but warns that tensions over “Taiwan independence” and external interference will sharpen, making US-China stabilisation crucial. Peng Weixue (彭维学) sees challenges outweighing opportunities, though US-China “constructive strategic stability” and Taiwan’s “doubt America, fear Trump” mood [疑美恐特] may help Beijing manage these risks. Zheng Jian (郑剑) argues that changes in global power, international alignments and attitudes towards war are creating more favourable conditions for China’s reunification with Taiwan. Qiu Changgen (仇长根) expects competition and confrontation to remain the main US-China trend, despite the newfound room for consultation, warning that Washington will not abandon “using Taiwan to contain China” but wants to avoid a strategically unbearable “Taiwan independence” crisis. — (中评社, 25 May)

4. Europe

Ding Chun (丁纯) and Wu Jiwei (吴佶蔚): The EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act signals a shift from “rules neutrality” to “conditional openness”, integrating decarbonisation, manufacturing revival, economic security and supply-chain control. It may push EU–China industrial ties from “goods trade” [产品贸易] towards “capacity cooperation” [产能合作], including joint investment, localised production and joint R&D. Yet its foreign-investment conditions in batteries, photovoltaics and other strategic sectors would most directly affect Chinese firms, creating potentially WTO-inconsistent discrimination. The Ministry of Commerce’s response is “reasonable and measured” [有理有节]: China remains open to dialogue, but reserves countermeasures if Chinese firms’ interests are harmed. — Ding Chun: Director, Centre for European Studies; Wu Jiwei: Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for the Belt and Road and Global Governance, Fudan University (China Focus, 13 May)

Wang Jiankun (王健坤) and Guo Kai (郭凯): The widening EU trade deficit with China is not driven primarily by Chinese overcapacity, low-price dumping, trade diversion from the US or weak Chinese demand, but by the interaction between Europe’s changing demand structure and China’s upgraded supply capacity. China’s export growth to Europe is concentrated in the “new three” (batteries, EVs and solar) and chemicals, reflecting Europe’s green transition, energy-cost pressures and shrinking local industrial capacity, rather than a general surge of cheap exports. On the import side, weaker EU exports to China stem less from Chinese market contraction than from falling import dependence and faster domestic substitution as China moves up the value chain. Tariffs and trade protection therefore cannot address the structural roots of the imbalance. — Researchers, China Finance 40 Forum (CF40 Research, 10 May)

5. Middle East & Pakistan

Hu Bo (胡波): After the war, Iran may be able to implement a system of “appropriate fees” for passage, allowing Tehran to present this as recognition of its leverage, and Washington to present the resumption of shipping as proof that navigation had been restored. For China, the lesson is that sea-lane security should not be over-militarised. Military power is a last-resort deterrent, while diplomacy, economics, finance and law should form the core toolkit [组合拳] for managing maritime chokepoints. China should aim for relative security, not an unaffordable pursuit of absolute security that would damage the open trade system on which China depends. — Research Professor and Director, Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University; Director, South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) (世界知识, Issue 10, 2026)

Liu Zongyi (刘宗义): China-Pakistan friendship remains strategically strong, but sustaining it requires economic realism, domestic development consensus, safer Chinese projects and deeper people-to-people affinity. CPEC 2.0 should move beyond the state-led “1+4” model towards high-quality co-construction, industrial cooperation, livelihood projects, private investment and market discipline, with Chinese support acting only as a catalyst for Pakistan’s own industrialisation. Security cooperation may require intelligence, counterterrorism technology and possible Chinese personnel, yet lasting stability depends on reducing extremism and improving centre-provincial relations. For Pakistan to become a South Asian “little China” [小中国], it would require a much deeper process of ideological emancipation [解放思想]. — Director, South Asia Research Centre, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (观察者网, 26 May)

Huang Yunsong (黄云松) and Wang Jing (王静): China’s reception of Pakistan’s civilian-military delegation reaffirms Pakistan’s priority in Beijing’s neighbourhood diplomacy, countering claims that the “ironclad” partnership has cooled. The wider prescription rests on consolidating Islamabad’s civil-military consensus, turning the Sino-Pakistani CPEC 2.0 into a platform for autonomous economic “blood-making” [自主造血] through industrial transfer, technological upgrading and supply-chain integration, and strengthening resilience against fiscal, political and regional pressure. Chinese governance experience, including party-school and public-policy cooperation, can help Pakistan manage domestic contradictions [内部矛盾] through development and multidimensional social governance [多维社会治理]. — Huang Yunsong: Vice Dean; Wang Jing: PhD candidate, School of International Studies, Sichuan University (观察者网, 29 May)

6. Chinese Economy

Huang Qifan (黄奇帆): China’s $1.2 trillion trade surplus reflects decades of manufacturing upgrading rather than an active export-surplus policy, but such an exceptional surplus is not sustainable, since it exceeds the internationally tolerable range and risks intensifying trade friction. Made in China 2025 has brought China close to one-third of global manufacturing value added, deepened domestic supply chains and shifted exports towards higher-value machinery and electronic products, yet a reasonable surplus should be 2–3% of GDP, or roughly $400–700 billion. Adjustment should combine gradual RMB appreciation, targeted cuts to export tax rebates as “invisible subsidies”, lower import tariffs, reduced labour “involution” among exporters and expanded paid leave to boost consumption. — Executive Vice Chair, Academic Committee, China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy; former Mayor of Chongqing (2026 Tsinghua PBCSF Global Finance Forum, 19 May)

Liu Yuanchun (刘元春): China’s goods surplus appears less exceptional once service-trade and investment-income deficits are considered, leaving a current-account surplus of roughly $800 billion [Note: a contestable accounting treatment] but the imbalance nonetheless exists and is rooted in China’s savings, investment and consumption structure. Rebalancing should therefore proceed through structural adjustment: greater overseas expansion, “optimised imports” [优化进口], stronger household consumption, broader consumer-service provision, more efficient investment, lower excessive net savings, expanded services trade and stronger pricing discipline. In AI and digital technology trade, data security rules and digital-trade regulation, especially in Europe, will shape China’s ability to export digital services and application scenarios, so future competition will turn as much on rules and governance systems as on technology itself. — President, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (澎湃, 18 May)

Yu Yongding (余永定): The 15th Five-Year Plan’s emphasis on building a modern infrastructure system has effectively answered claims that China has run out of useful infrastructure investment opportunities, with market estimates suggesting nearly RMB 40 trillion of investment over the plan period, or more than RMB 7 trillion annually. The 2009 four-trillion-yuan stimulus [四万亿计划] was a “great success” [巨大成功] in delivering a V-shaped rebound after the global financial crisis, even though it also created serious problems, including inefficient investment, shadow banking and local debt. Those flaws do not invalidate infrastructure investment as a macroeconomic tool; rather, they show the need for better institutional design. Consumption support, including trade-in subsidies and vouchers, cannot by itself deliver durable demand, whereas infrastructure investment serves public needs while generating stronger multipliers and crowding-in effects. — Academician and Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (观察者网, 12 May)

Li Xunlei (李迅雷): China’s use of stimulus to prevent sharp downturns since the 2008 financial crisis should not be mistaken for immunity to economic cycles, since macro tools can stabilise headline growth while leaving deeper cyclical forces intact and aggravating overcapacity, weak PPI and dependence on investment and exports. Cycles are deep forces, and reading steadier GDP figures as recovery is like mistaking a falling fever for a cured illness. The property market is now the main drag on China’s economy, shaped by population ageing, slower urbanisation and weak effective demand [有效需求不足]. Policy therefore needs to tackle the demand-side roots of the cycle through higher household incomes, distributional and fiscal reform, and less reliance on investment-led stabilisation, rather than measures that merely support GDP or produce isolated rallies. — Chief Economist, Zhongtai International (李迅雷金融与投资, 24 May)

Liu Shijin (刘世锦): China’s demand problem is rooted in weak end-user demand [终端需求], so raising rural pensions would do more for growth than relying on investment-led stimulus without real demand behind it. The slowdown in property and infrastructure has exposed a consumption gap long masked by real estate expansion, producing low nominal growth, weak prices, overcapacity and heavier debt. Raising pensions for 170–180 million rural recipients from roughly 249 yuan a month towards 600 or 1,000 yuan would directly lift low-income consumption and support GDP. Macro policy should put funds at the source of demand: “effective investment” [有效投资] must rise with demand, not replace it. — Vice Chair, Economic Affairs Committee of the 13th CPPCC; former Vice President, Development Research Centre of the State Council (腾讯财经, 8 May)

Zheng Yongnian (郑永年): China needs more economic breakthroughs rooted in a vibrant society, where enterprise is “allowed to get lively and managed well” [放得活、管得好] rather than be “governed to death” [管死], enabling development and security to “walk on two legs” [两条腿走路]. Zhang Xue Motorcycles is emblematic: a junior-middle-school-educated mechanic turned practical skill, entrepreneurial flair, supportive local capital and China’s accumulated manufacturing capabilities into a globally visible industrial success. Yet local governments and private capital often rush into and then abandon strategic sectors such as chips, large models and EVs, spreading China’s limited capital too thinly. The priority should be to give SMEs and private firms fairer access to finance, expand room to experiment and the definition of “talent”, and establish clearer boundaries between state and market. — Dean, School of Public Policy, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen (观一线, 28 May)

Liu Xiaoxia (刘笑霞) & Yang Yuanyuan (杨媛媛): “Reverse mixed-ownership reform” [反向混改], meaning state-owned capital taking stakes in private firms, has become a national capital-market phenomenon, examined here through a Jiangsu survey of private enterprises. Private firms seek state capital to obtain resources, ease liquidity pressure, integrate supply chains, solve succession problems and improve governance, while state capital pursues rescue, returns and strategic industrial layout. Yet the reform risks being misunderstood as one-way assistance without reciprocal obligations, while state-asset supervision can overemphasise control, reinforcing fears of “state advance, private retreat” [国进民退], cultural friction and lower efficiency. — Liu Xiaoxia: Professor; Yang Yuanyuan: PhD candidate, School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology (社会科学文摘, Issue 3, 2026)

Wang Qing (王庆): Building a national unified market has moved from removing visible barriers to regularising rules, improving system-wide efficiency and supporting institutional opening, while serving security as the “ballast stone” of economic security by improving resource allocation, attracting global resources and stabilising supply chains. Explicit local protection and market segmentation have been largely addressed, but indirect protection persists through local investment funds and SOE platforms. In addition, fiscal incentives and official performance assessments continue to encourage local GDP growth and firm protection over national market efficiency, making it necessary to strengthen “national chessboard” consciousness [全国一盘棋] and systems thinking among cadres. — Associate Research Fellow, Capital Markets Research Office, Institute of Finance and Banking, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Researcher, Center for National Balance Sheet, National Institution for Finance and Development (金融时报, 7 May)

7. Research and Education

Wang Mingyuan (王明远): Recent accusations of paper-padding, fraud and academic corruption expose the production-line logic and “froth” within Chinese research, where originality has been displaced by metricised output and “performance-grid management” [绩效网格化]. Quantity-based rankings create an illusion of Chinese scientific supremacy: China’s Nature Index output rose from 5,022 papers in 2014 to 32,122 in 2024, producing anomalies such as Sichuan University ranking above Stanford and Jilin University above MIT, yet by the share of papers in the global top 10% for citations, no non-Hong Kong Chinese universities enter the top 50. China’s bottlenecks will not be solved by producing still more doctoral students, but by breaking an evaluation regime that rewards grant-hunting, title accumulation and bureaucratic compliance while burying the genuinely talented. — Research Fellow, Beijing Reform and Development Society (阜成门六号院, 21 May)

Yao Yang (姚洋): China’s struggle to produce truly original, world-class talent — the “Qian Xuesen question” — stems from confusing education with selection: exams, elite tracks and early “cream-skimming” [掐尖] cannot manufacture “geniuses”. The 985, 211 and Double First-Class policies have lifted China’s best universities in global rankings, but they have also hardened institutional stratification, making admission to Peking and Tsinghua the organising logic of schools and families. However, “geniuses” need a looser environment in which to emerge. Education must recover its function of cultivation, not merely selection. — Dean, Dishui Lake Advanced Finance Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (姚洋说, 9 May)

Sun Xueyu (孙学玉): China’s “talent security” challenge combines internal bottlenecks — high-end talent shortages, structural imbalance and insufficient use — with external risks such as overseas students not returning and high-level talent loss. The response should include: 1) legal safeguards, talent datasets and security training to protect major national projects and key technologies; 2) “autonomous cultivation” that encourages innovation, tolerates failure, expands STEM and skills enrolment, and corrects Chinese education’s tendency to value “intuition over logic, principle over technique, generalism over specialisation” [重感性轻逻辑、重道轻术、重通轻专]; 3) global recruitment through visas and overseas research platforms; and 4) “loyalty education” to defend national interests and state secrets. — Special Commissioner, State Ethnic Affairs Commission; Director, Editorial Board, China Information Security (中国信息安全, Issue 4, 2026)

Wen Hongyu (文红玉) & Hao Haiguang (郝海光): Chinese universities are becoming defined by a “stranger phenomenon”. Dormitories were once imagined as a “second family”, but students now tend to maintain shallow relationships that avoid personal topics so that everyday interaction continues in the form of aimless “relationship idling” [关系空转], without becoming usable “social capital”. Classrooms have turned into sites of “functional attendance”, with a culture of exam-driven and risk-averse learning causing students to avoid speaking because they fear mistakes or being seen as showing off. Expression shifts online, causing the “collapse of the physical ‘nearby’” [空间“附近”的塌缩], while student organisations and supervisor-student ties become increasingly ritualised. The urgent task is to preserve “warmth” within rational modern boundaries, rather than let students become lonely islands. — School of Marxism, Huazhong University of Science and Technology (当代青年研究, Issue 2, 2026)

8. Tech & AI

Huang Yiping (黄益平): AI may reinforce deflationary pressure in China if “intelligence abundance” allows productivity and supply to expand faster than household income and demand. This resembles the problem identified in Xiong Wei’s work on China’s production-oriented monetary policy: credit expansion may briefly lift inflation, but soon creates stronger downward pressure by stimulating supply more effectively than demand. The deeper risk is a “substitution spiral” in which firms rationally replace labour and wages fall, weakening aggregate demand and thereby increasing pressure on firms to cut costs by substituting still more workers. Macroeconomic policy must therefore incorporate new monetary, employment and distribution frameworks to mitigate these risks and support demand. — Boya Distinguished Professor and Dean, National School of Development, Peking University (辛庄课堂, 6 May)

Dai Mingjie (戴明洁): As US AI militarisation expands the strategic uses of new technology, Chinese AI risks going the way of the “four great inventions”: a frontier technology may again be channelled more into civilian consumption than into military, industrial and national power. Palantir, Anduril and SpaceX are being drawn into a new “technology–military-industrial complex”, embedding AI into kill chains and command systems. By contrast, Chinese AI applications and capital flows remain concentrated in the consumer internet, turning AI into “entertainment infrastructure” rather than a strategic productive force. This reflects the platform-economy path dependence of Chinese internet giants, visible in the 2025 food-delivery subsidy war, which wasted capital that could have been used for high-tech R&D. — Research Fellow, Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology (IPP Review, 6 May)

Zhang Zhan (张战): Accelerating strategic capability in emerging domains is now pivotal to converting China’s new quality productive forces into new quality combat power [新质战斗力], thereby strengthening China’s integrated national strategic system amid technological and military upheaval. The priority is to seize initiative in AI, quantum information, biotechnology, aerospace, deep-sea and other frontier fields, translating scientific breakthroughs into deterrence, asymmetric advantage and future warfighting capacity while breaking bottlenecks imposed by external technological containment. Policy execution must rest on Party leadership, the new whole-nation system [新型举国体制], civil-military resource integration, strategic science projects and talent mobilisation. — Political Commissar, National University of Defense Technology (Study Times, 6 May)

Hormuz and the Global Order: From Maritime Chokepoints to Continental Corridors (22 May)

As the Hormuz crisis drags on, Chinese analysts are moving beyond oil prices to a bigger question: what happens when US power can no longer keep maritime chokepoints open? The answer is not restoration, but adaptation — land corridors, Eurasian connectivity and a more fragmented global order. Read here

Trump-Xi Summit: Chinese Analysts on the New Strategic Stalemate (19 May)

Chinese analysts emerged from Trump’s Beijing visit strikingly upbeat. The summit is being read not merely as a reset, but as proof that coercion has reached its limits and US-China relations have entered a phase of strategic stalemate. Stability now rests on parity and mutual constraint. Taiwan is the test. Read here

China’s G2 Dilemma (17 May 2026)

Beijing says it rejects “G2”. Chinese analysts are less ready to let it go. Trump’s revival of the phrase has exposed an awkward question at the heart of Chinese strategy: can China take the status, bargaining power and stability that come with US peer recognition without explicitly accepting a two-power order — or losing the Global South in the process? Read here

Yan Xuetong on the World to 2035: Hegemony and Its Challengers (11 May)

Leading Chinese IR scholar Yan Xuetong’s forecast to 2035 sketches a harder, more divided world: entrenched US-China bipolarity, middle powers hedging issue by issue, AI-driven overproduction, fractured markets, rival digital spheres and more frequent cyber conflict. The sharper question is what follows disorder: can China wait out what Yan calls the current wave of “counter-globalisation” and help shape a more morally grounded order? Read here

Spring Recovery or Price-Shock Mirage? | Economics Digest: April 2026 (6 May)

Our first economics digest cuts through China’s spring-recovery debate. Was Q1 a genuine turn, or a rebound flattered by commodity prices, policy front-loading and fragile confidence? Economists divide over infrastructure stimulus, household rebalancing, local-government exhaustion, RMB internationalisation and the Iran war’s economic spillovers — revealing a debate more contested, and more politically constrained, than headline optimism suggests. Read here

Triangles and Chokepoints | Digest: April 2026 (4 May)

Last month’s digest follows Chinese analysts as they make sense of a more fractured world: Europe’s search for autonomy, US-China economic pressure, the Iran war, vulnerable energy routes, RMB internationalisation and AI governance. Across these debates, one question keeps returning: how can China build resilience when the systems it relies on become less reliable? Read here.

Today’s top items:

1. New regulations on outbound investment - The State Council released the State Council Regulations on Outbound Investment (国务院关于对外投资的规定), consisting of 34 articles. Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 837 promulgating the text on May 5, and the public release came on June 1, with a joint Q&A from the Ministry of Justice, NDRC, and MOFCOM. The regulation takes effect July 1. I have posted a translation of the regulations here and of the Q&A here.

Most of the content consolidates existing laws and regulations. The Q&A says explicitly that the prior model — outbound investment governed “principally on the basis of departmental rules and normative documents” — “no longer meets current needs” given “geopolitical risks” and intensifying “international competition.” This was in the State Council’s 2025 and 2026 legislative work plans. NDRC and MOFCOM say more implementing rules will follow.

Some of the interesting sections:

Article 13 intends to plug workarounds, including ones Manus and its investors used:

Article 13. In conducting outbound investment activities, investors shall not export or use goods, technologies, services, or related data whose export is prohibited by the state, nor shall they export or use goods, technologies, services, or related data whose export is restricted by the state without authorization; they shall not transfer to other countries (or regions) any goods, technologies, services, or related data whose export is prohibited by the state — including by such means as dispatching technical personnel across borders, organizing personnel to work in other countries (or regions), providing technical guidance across borders, or arranging cross-border training of personnel — nor shall they transfer without authorization to other countries (or regions) any goods, technologies, services, or related data whose export is restricted by the state.

第十三条 投资者开展对外投资活动，不得出口、使用国家禁止出口的货物、技术、服务及相关数据，或者未经许可出口、使用国家限制出口的货物、技术、服务及相关数据；不得以跨境派遣技术人员、组织人员赴其他国家（地区）工作、跨境提供技术指导、安排人员跨境培训等方式向其他国家（地区）转移国家禁止出口的货物、技术、服务及相关数据，或者未经许可向其他国家（地区）转移国家限制出口的货物、技术、服务及相关数据。

Article 15 establishes an overseas investment security review run by the investment and commerce authorities with other State Council departments, covering both the investment itself and any later transfer or disposal of related assets, equity, or interests.

The Q&A insists the possible countermeasures listed in Articles 24-25 are “protective, defensive” and “do not affect normal market transactions.”:

Article 24. Where any country (or region) or international organization, in violation of international law and the basic norms of international relations, takes discriminatory prohibitive or restrictive measures or other similar measures against the People’s Republic of China in matters such as investment and business operations, the Chinese government and its relevant departments may take corresponding measures in light of the actual circumstances to protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of investors and their outbound investments and to protect the state’s overseas interests from threats and harm.

第二十四条 任何国家（地区）、国际组织违反国际法和国际关系基本准则，在投资经营等方面对中华人民共和国采取歧视性禁止、限制或者其他类似措施，中国政府及其有关部门可以根据实际情况采取相应的措施，保护投资者及其对外投资的安全和正当权益，保护国家的海外利益不受威胁和侵害。

The relevant departments of the State Council may, in accordance with the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Provisions on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China, and other rules, decide to add to the countermeasures list those organizations and individuals that directly or indirectly participate in formulating, deciding on, or implementing the discriminatory prohibitive, restrictive, or other similar measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, and take corresponding measures.

国务院有关部门可以依照《中华人民共和国反外国制裁法》、《实施〈中华人民共和国反外国制裁法〉的规定》等，决定将直接或者间接参与制定、决定、实施前款规定的歧视性禁止、限制或者其他类似措施的组织、个人列入反制清单，采取相应的措施。

Article 25. Where foreign organizations or individuals endanger China’s national sovereignty, security, or development interests; violate normal market transaction principles by interrupting normal transactions with Chinese enterprises, other organizations, or individuals; or take discriminatory measures against investors and their outbound investments, unreasonably depriving them of or restricting their legitimate rights and interests, the relevant departments of the State Council may take measures including: prohibiting or restricting their engagement in import and export activities related to China; prohibiting or restricting their investment within China; prohibiting or restricting organizations and individuals within China from conducting related transactions, cooperation, or other activities with them; prohibiting or restricting the entry into China of related personnel, products, or means of transportation; and revoking or restricting the eligibility of related persons to work, stay, or reside within China. The relevant measures may apply to organizations that are actually controlled by, or participated in the establishment or operation of by, the foreign organizations or individuals concerned.

第二十五条 外国组织、个人危害中国国家主权、安全、发展利益，违反正常的市场交易原则中断与中国企业、其他组织或者个人的正常交易，或者对投资者及其对外投资采取歧视性措施，不合理剥夺或者限制投资者及其对外投资正当权益的，国务院有关部门可以采取禁止或者限制其从事与我国有关的进出口活动，禁止或者限制其在中国境内投资，禁止或者限制中国境内的组织、个人与其进行有关交易、合作等活动，禁止或者限制相关人员、产品、交通运输工具等入境，取消或者限制相关人员在中国境内工作、停留或者居留资格等措施。有关措施可以适用于外国组织、个人实际控制或者参与设立、运营的组织。

They are intensifying efforts to control capital flows, prevent technology leakage, and prevent supply chain decoupling.

2. Developing future industries - The June 1 issue of Qiushi has as its main theme the development of future industries, and the lead article from Xi is part of his speech at the January 30, 2026 Politburo Study Session on this topic. I have translated Xi’s article here, and created a summary of the issue here.

Xi explains why this is important: “Cultivating and developing future industries carries major significance for us in seizing the commanding heights of science, technology, and industry”.

The “six future industries chosen as the main directions of attack” are quantum science and technology, biomanufacturing, hydrogen energy and nuclear fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, and sixth-generation mobile communications.

According to the editor’s introduction to the issue:

In support of studying and implementing the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important article, this issue carries an accompanying article by the Qiushi Editorial Department, “How Future Industries Will Shape the Future of Industrial Development” (未来产业何以塑造产业发展未来), which offers exegesis from three perspectives; an article by Yin Hejun, explaining how to lead future-industry development with high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening; an article by Zhang Jun, expounding on consolidating the foundations of future-industry development through source innovation; and an article by Liu Zhenzhong, discussing perceptions and reflections on developing future industries.

To reinforce the messaging, the Monday People’s Daily carries a page nine article by Li Lecheng, Party Secretary and Minister of Industry and Information Technology - Accelerating Forward-Looking Layout and Development of Future Industries.

Underestimate their seriousness in this endeavor at your peril.

3. EU-China trade tensions heating up - The European Commission College of Commissioners met Friday to “take stock of EU-China relations”. According to the readout:

The Commission’s overarching approach remains de-risking, not decoupling. China is a critical partner, and engagement and dialogue will continue. At the same time the current state of the trade and investment relationship is not sustainable. As economic and security interests become ever more intertwined, both dimensions will require a more robust and coherent response.

The PRC government responded quickly, with a piece by CCTV’s Yuyuan Tantian over the weekend refuting claims of “overcapacity” and threatening specific retaliation:

According to an exclusive disclosure from a source, China can launch anti-discrimination investigations and industrial supply-chain security investigations into the EU’s relevant practices. The Ministry of Commerce has made clear that once China’s national interests and the rights and interests of its enterprises are harmed, China will resolutely retaliate.

据消息人士独家披露，中方可以对欧方有关做法发起反歧视调查、产供链安全调查。商务部已明确表态，一旦中国国家利益和企业权益受到损害，中方将坚决反制。

If the EU insists on pushing the so-called “overcapacity tool,” China will surely act at the first moment, adopting comprehensive countermeasures. China is neither unfamiliar with nor afraid of trade frictions, and will see this through to the end.

如果欧盟执意推动所谓的”产能过剩工具”，中方必将第一时间采取行动，采取综合性反制措施。中方对贸易摩擦既不陌生也不害怕，奉陪到底。

Third, the logic of the EU’s accusations does not hold up in itself.

第三，欧盟的指责逻辑本身站不住脚。

France has been China’s largest source of cosmetics imports for three consecutive years, accounting for 29.6% of China’s total cosmetics imports in 2025. EU exports to China of meat, alcohol, luxury goods, cosmetics, and other products all hold significant shares in the Chinese market.

法国已连续三年成为我国第一大化妆品进口来源地，2025年占据我国化妆品进口总额的29.6%。欧盟出口到中国的肉类、酒类、奢侈品、化妆品等产品，在中国市场都占据了显著份额。

If the EU uses the absurd logic of “production capacity exceeding domestic demand” to accuse Chinese products of “overcapacity,” then whether these European products sold in China are in the same situation is also worth considering.

如果欧盟用所谓”生产能力超过本土需求”的荒谬逻辑指责中国产品”产能过剩”，那么这些在华销售的欧洲产品是否存在同样的情况，也就值得考虑了。

4. Taiwan missing from US speech at Shangri-La Dialogue - For the first time on over a decade, the US Defense Secretary’s speech at the annual Singapore event did not mention Taiwan. Last year, Secretary Hegseth mentioned Taiwan five times in his speech. His full remarks are consistent with the recent National Defense Strategy, which PRC officials did not see as “soft” on China, and statements like “our approach in the Pacific centers on deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain”, of which Taiwan is a key part reinforce that view. However, given President Trump’s recent Taiwan remarks, and the lack of any updates about the status of the proposed large arms sales package to Taiwan, people are right to ask what has changed.

5. Japan and “new militarism” - In his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Japanese Defense Minister Koizumi pushed on PRC claims that Japan is pushing “new militarism”:

Distinguished guests, some of you may have heard the term “new militarism,” but nothing [could be] further from the truth.

Think about it. There is a country that has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. Japan has neither of such weapons. And yet Japan is labeled “new militarism.” Isn’t it strange?

The reaction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was as expected:

The remarks from the Japanese official you mentioned have no basis at all. They have zero authority in front of history, law, facts and figures. There is no way that making such remarks will help Japan earn the trust of its Asian neighbors and the international community…

The Japanese official you mentioned deliberately evaded Japan’s historical crimes and the facts above. He even attempted to shift blame and create confusion. Is this a sign of unease, or an attempt to conceal Japan’s own military expansionist ambitions? Under such circumstances, Japan’s claim that it seeks dialogue is just performative and shows no sincerity at all.

The latest issue of Qiushi has an article by “Qing Yuan 青原”, a pen name used for authoritative commentary/articles on foreign affairs, titled Recognizing the Concrete Threat of Japan’s “New Militarism”.

So no signs of any offramp in Japan-PRC tensions…

6. Chip export control dysfunction - On Sunday the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a brief guidance to close a loophole created with the scrapping of the AI Diffusion Rule that allowed the sale of the most advanced AI chips to overseas subsidiaries of PRC firms. According to Reuters, an anonymous paper that circulated last week highlighting this loophole is what caused BIS to issue this weekend guidance. This updated guidance does also address the loophole that allows TSMC and other fabs make advanced chips for overseas subs of PRC companies, but it does not prevent shell companies of those PRC firms from having advanced chips fabbed at TSMC et al. It is a mess. PRC officials will likely not be pleased, but since these restrictions pre-dated the Busan understanding, the Trump team can credibly argue that issuing this guidance is not a violation of that deal.

And yes, export controls definitely will fail if you do not even try to enforce them…

7. Li Qiang on reserves - Last week Premier Li made an inspection tour to Zhoushan and Ningbo, Zhejiang, and visited the Zhoushan National Petroleum Reserve Base, the Bulk Agricultural Products Storage and Transportation Base, and the Ningbo Daxie Commercial Petroleum Reserve Project among other places. His call to “enhance the international influence of the price-formation mechanism for bulk commodities” (增强大宗商品价格形成机制的国际影响力) and to explore futures-spot linkage at the Zhejiang International Bulk Commodity Trading Center is the long-running effort to move China from commodity price-taker to price-maker and relocate some of the global benchmarking that currently sits in London, Singapore and Chicago.

During his tour of the Zhoushan national strategic reserve base and the Ningbo Daxie commercial petroleum reserve, he explicitly called for “coordinated operation between strategic reserves and commercial reserves” (战略储备、商业储备等协同运作) and improved rotation, deployment, and market regulation mechanisms”. The petroleum reserve system appears to have worked well for China during the current Iran war supply shock, but will be interesting to learn, if we ever do, what the leadership thinks should be improved.

8. More on the expelled New York Times reporter - The New York Times finally wrote an article admitting that the PRC had revoked the visa of its correspondent Vivian Wang, “in response to the appearance by video of Taiwan’s president at a Times DealBook summit in New York in December”. The Trump Administration responded by revoking the visa of a Xinhua employee in the US.

According to the Foreign Ministry:

The New York Times provided platform for Taiwan authorities to peddle separatist rhetoric for “Taiwan independence,” and blatantly called China’s Taiwan region a “country.” This grossly violates the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, and sends a gravely wrong signal to “Taiwan independence” separatist forces. China firmly opposes it. The New York Times should correct its wrongdoings rather than continue down the wrong path.

This is an intensification of the efforts to enforce the “correct” understanding of and discourse about Taiwan globally, and also a convenient pretext for the PRC relevant organs to expel a very good reporter they did not like. How will the New York Times handle China and Taiwan at this year’s conference? And will this punishment affect the agendas of conferences by other media organizations with correspondents in the PRC?

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On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with the news that Beijing moved to further ease hukou restrictions, including why this is a welcome change for millions of Chinese citizens, as well as a look at questions and challenges as the reforms are implemented. Then: A report that Chinese AI talent has been restricted from leaving China, while Beijing continues its efforts to control capital outflow and offshore investments. From there: Indications that the US has indeed paused its second tranche of arms sales to Taiwan, and more details on a US-China board of investment. Then: PRC-Japan updates, including reports of Takaichi recriminations from Xi in his meeting with Trump, heavy rare earth shipments restricted for the past four months, the cards Japan has yet to play, and Mao's strategic stalemate as a stage of protracted war, not an endgame. At the end: An American journalist for Xinhua and other state outlets is arrested and accused of acting as an unregistered agent of th…

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There were rumors last week that Xi Jinping would travel to North Korea this week. So far there has been no confirmation, but if he is going, the DPRK launching a ballistic missile in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, on the eve of a possible visit and while Wang Yi is in New York speaking to the UN Security Council, seems awkward.

Today’s top items:

1. Wang Yi at the UN - Foreign Minister Wang Yi used China’s May presidency of the Security Council to convene a high-level meeting on Monday in New York on “Upholding the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter and Strengthening the UN-Centered International System,” with representatives from over 100 countries, including more than 20 foreign ministers, in attendance. I have posted a translation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summary of his comments.

Wang said “the c…

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If there is going to be a publicly announced May Politburo meeting, it should happen this week. There was no announced May meeting in 2023 or 2025, for reasons unknown.

Today’s top items:

1. Xi meets Pakistan PM - Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir were in Beijing Monday. Xi met Shehbaz, Li Qiang held formal talks with him and witnessed the signing of cooperation documents on trade, science and technology, agriculture and human resources. Wang Yi met Munir separately. Xi and Wang Yi both gave Pakistan credit for its role mediating between Washington and Tehran. Xi said:

China appreciates Pakistan’s initiative in taking responsibility, playing a mediating role for the restoration of peace in the Middle East. The two sides should continue to maintain close communication and coordination, jointly oppos…

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1. State Council Executive Meeting - Premier Li presided Thursday over this week’s meeting. They are usually held on Friday I believe, so I wonder why they moved it up a day. The agenda of the meeting was “to study work related to advancing the building of a unified national market, review and adopt the “15th Five-Year Plan” for Building a Modernized Emergency-Management System, and discuss the People’s Bank of China Law of the People’s Republic of China (Revised Draft)”. According to the readout:

The meeting noted that building a unified national market is required for constructing a new development pattern and promoting high-quality development. In recent years, the building of a unified national market has yielded positive results and made important progress, but sustained effort over the long term is still needed. Related institutional construction must be pushed forward in depth, with further improvement of systems for property-rights protection, market access, f…

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On today's show Andrew and Bill parse the messaging from both sides of last week's US-China summit in Beijing. Topics include: What the PRC means by "a constructive relationship of strategic stability," why the US side adopted the framing as well, a relative absence of tangible deliverables, and why "a calculated stalling tactic from both sides designed to manage risk" may be a more accurate rendering of the status quo. From there: Trump's various comments on Taiwan spark concern and questions, plus notes on Rubio, Ratner, an indictment of Chinese shipping magnates, and an Iran ceasefire Xi calls "imperative." At the end: Vladimir Putin's visit to Beijing, questions for the EU, and more bad news for Nvidia in China.

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Unilateral coercion, hegemonism, bloc confrontation, and undercurrents of neo-colonialism are surging. International law and the basic norms of international relations are repeatedly being trampled upon. Many global governance institutions face growing difficulty in coordinating action among states and mediating international disputes, and are struggling to function effectively. World peace and development face new risks and challenges, and there is a danger of the international community fragmenting and regressing back to the law of the jungle. - Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Advocating Global Multipolarity and a New Type of International Relations

Today’s top items:

1. No new gas pipeline for Putin? - Russian President Putin is already on his way back home after meeting with Xi on Wednesday. It appears he did not get the deal he has most coveted, the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. The two sides did sign twenty cooperation documents and i…

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1. Putin arrives in Beijing - Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing late Tuesday with a large entourage of government ministers and executives. Wang Yi greeted him at the airport. There are no new details on what to expect from this trip beyond what I mentioned yesterday.

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The entry of the China-US strategic contest into a new phase of strategic stalemate is the second logical premise for our consideration of the correct way for China and the United States to get along. From the historical experience of great-power rivalries, the relations between major powers in a stalemate phase often face severe tests of high winds and rough seas, even of stormy waves; if handled poorly, the relationship faces the major risk of capsizing. How China and the United States coexist in the stalemate phase concerns not only the two countries but the entire world. - China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

Today’s top items:

1. Outcomes from Trump’s visit to China - On Saturday the Ministry of Commerce released a statement on initial outcomes from the summit, and on Sunday the White House issued a fact sheet. They are not in complete alignment, but there will be a Board of Trade, to facilitate “managed trade”, and a Board of Investment. I had Claude create this comparison graphic:

The White House fact sheet also stated that:

• President Trump and President Xi agreed that the United States and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity. President Trump will welcome President Xi for a visit to Washington this fall. The two countries will support each other as the respective hosts of the G20 and APEC Summits later this year.

• Both leaders agreed Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, called to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and agreed that no country or organization can be allowed to charge tolls.

• President Trump and President Xi confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea.

The PRC side did not mention the second and third points.

Agreeing “that the United States and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity” is a big win for Xi Jinping and the PRC, as this framework is an evolution of Xi’s longstanding attempts to get the US to agree to a new type of major/great-power relationship with the United States. The US side added “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity”, and right now the White House does not see a lot of fairness and reciprocity in the relationship, so this new phase of strategic stalemate may be stabilizing but it is also tenuous.

2. Constructive relationship of strategic stability - I wrote Thursday that so far this looked to be the most important outcome from the meeting, and that conclusion stands. Wang Yi briefed the media Friday on the meetings and discussed the concept in a bit more detail. This has been a concept long in the works, and as I wrote above it is an evolution of the idea of a new type of major/great-power relationship with the United States.

On the day Trump arrived in Beijing, the Institute of American Studies research group of the MSS think tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), issued a report titled “The Great Changes in the World and the Way for China and the US to Coexist”, which I have translated in full here. The abstract says the two countries have “entered a new phase of strategic stalemate 战略相持的新阶段”:

The two countries urgently need to explore a correct way of getting along that fits the new realities of the relationship. To this end, the Institute of American Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations established a research group to consider, against the backdrop of great changes in the world and the new phase of China-US relations, how to build a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability framework, and to push the two major powers toward mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.

两国迫切需要探索一条适应中美关系新现实的正确相处之道。为此，中国现代国际关系研究院美国研究所成立课题组，立足世界大变局和中美关系新阶段，思考如何构建中美建设性战略稳定框架，推动中美两个大国迈向相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢。

Previous US administrations had resisted entering into these kinds of new frameworks defined by the PRC side, so even with the US conditions of “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity” this is a very significant move by the Trump team. I believe they understand that the Chinese will use this hard won period of tenuous stability to do everything they can to derisk and reduce reliance on the US, as the PRC effectively articulated in the new 15th Five Year Plan, but it is not clear the US side has the political will or capacity to do the same, especially as the PRC will be using every lever at their disposal to push back on further attempts in the US to derisk and reduce reliance on the PRC.

As Li Haokai wrote in a Substack post “Stripping Away the Optimistic Rhetoric of the Xi-Trump Summit Reveals China’s Realist Playbook” on the outcomes:

My overarching assessment is that we must strictly distinguish the superficial optics of this summit from the true, underlying nature of the relationship. Within China, very few serious strategists are viewing these developments as positively as they appear. Instead of a genuine relationship “recovery” or a strategic reset, some of the leading Chinese scholars interpret the current dynamic through the lens of hard-nosed realpolitik. Tracking the assessments of prominent figures like Wu Xinbo, Yan Xuetong, and Jin Canrong reveals that we might be witnessing a calculated stalling tactic (缓兵之计) from both sides designed to manage risk as both nations lock into a protracted strategic stalemate (战略相持).

3. Trump’s problematic Taiwan comments - There was concern going into the summit that President Trump might agree to change US policy from “not supporting” Taiwan independence to “opposing” Taiwan independence, and that he would further delay or cancel a planned large arms slle to Taiwan. He was remarkably disciplined in his comments on Taiwan, until his Friday interview for Brett Baier of Fox News. From the transcript:

Donald Trump: they have somebody there now that wants to go independent. Well, it’s a very risky thing. When you go independent, you know, they are going independent because they want to get into a war, and they want to, they figure they have a United States behind them, I’d like to see it stay the way it is.

And I’ll tell you something, I’ll make a little news, I’d like to see everybody making chips over in Taiwan come into America, because to be honest with you, I think it’s the greatest thing you can do, because it’s a heated situation…

Bret Baier: Should the people of Taiwan feel more or less secure after your meetings with President Xi?

Donald Trump: Neutral. Neutral. This thing going on for years...

Bret Baier: Has the policy changed at all?...

Donald Trump: No, nothing has changed. I will say this: I’m not looking to have somebody go independent, and you know, we are supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down.

Bret Baier: But you are waiting on approving billions of dollars of weapons for Taiwan. Is that moving forward?

Donald Trump: That’s, well, I have not approved it yet. We are going to see what happens. I may do it. I may not do it.

Bret Baier: Yes, what’s your hinge point?

Donald Trump: Well, I’m not going to say that. But I may do it, I may not do it. But we are not looking to have wars, and we are, if you kept it the way it is, I think China is going to be OK with that. But we are not looking to have somebody say let’s go independent, because the United States is backing us. You know?

Bret Baier: So, President Xi probably liked that you have not approved the weapons to Taiwan.

Donald Trump: I would say like is maybe too strong a word, because he thinks I could do it with just the signing of my signature, unlike Biden, who couldn’t sign his signature. No, I’m holding that in abeyance, and it depends on China. Depends, it’s a, it’s a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly. It’s a lot of weapons, it’s $12 billion.

So officially the US policy has not changed, but his comments have caused a lot of consternation. So now we have to wait to see if the arms package is approved, either in its full size or broken up into smaller chunks, or just cancelled. And if it is killed, will Trump get something for it from Xi? The DPP should probably increase its DC lobbying budget…

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So far the most important news from the Thursday meeting, from what we can see publicly, is that the US and China have agreed to “build a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability as the new positioning for China-U.S. relations…[that] will provide strategic guidance for China-U.S. relations over the next three years and beyond”, at least according to Xi’s opening statement at the meeting with Trump:

Xi stressed that China is committed to the stable, healthy, and sustainable development of China-U.S. relations. President Trump and I agreed to build a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability as the new positioning for China-U.S. relations. This will provide strategic guidance for China-U.S. relations over the next three years and beyond, and will, I believe, be welcomed by the two peoples and the international community. “Constructive strategic stability” should be positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, a sound stability with moderate competition, a constant stability with manageable differences, and an enduring stability with promises of peace. A “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” is not a slogan but should be reflected in actions that move in the same direction.

习近平强调，中方致力于中美关系稳定、健康、可持续发展。我同特朗普总统赞同将构建”中美建设性战略稳定关系”作为中美关系新定位，将为未来3年乃至更长时间的中美关系提供战略指引，相信会受到两国人民和国际社会的欢迎。”建设性战略稳定”应该是合作为主的积极稳定，应该是竞争有度的良性稳定，应该是分歧可控的常态稳定，应该是和平可期的持久稳定。”中美建设性战略稳定关系”不是一句口号，而应该是相向而行的行动。

Xi defined the four pillars of this new positioning, translation of the four areas via Xinhua:

1. positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay 合作为主的积极稳定指引

2. sound stability with moderate competition 竞争有度的良性稳定

3. constant stability with manageable differences 分歧可控的常态稳定

4. enduring stability with promises of peace 和平可期的持久稳定。

The PRC leadership wants a period of strategic detente and this concept could realize that on terms favorable to them for the rest of Trump’s second term. Any future U.S. moves to address PRC industrial overcapacity, tighten technology controls, etc. could then be cast by Beijing as violations of the new “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” to which the two leaders personally agreed.

The formulation (tifa 提法) accepts that the US-China relationship is competitive — as Xi did in 2023 with the Biden administration — but it now insists that competition be kept “moderate” (有度) and that differences be “manageable” (可控). This may allow China to get to define what counts as acceptable competition. It also makes Xi and his team look like they have successfully stood their ground against the Trump Administration and are now negotiating from a position of equal strength.

This is a useful point from Li Yaqi’s Substack:

A relationship you have stabilized is a relationship you can compete inside for a long time without it breaking. Stability is not the opposite of rivalry here. It is the container that makes a long rivalry survivable. “Fighting step by step” is, structurally, what managed long-term competition looks like from the inside…

It is disciplined struggle from the position of strength…

The phrase matters because it captures the cadre requirement behind this new diplomatic language. China’s diplomats are not only expected to take a proactive and assertive stance on matters of principle. They are also expected to struggle with skill: to use experience, judgment, timing, and tactical discipline to advance strategic objectives. In that sense, new tifa should not be mistaken for a post-competitive mood. It is closer to an operating doctrine for competition that has become more mature, more sensitive, and more bureaucratically tooled.

Did the US side agree to this new formulation for US-China relations? It is not mentioned in the much shorter White House readout from the same meeting, posted to X:

President Trump had a good meeting with President Xi of China. The two sides discussed ways to enhance economic cooperation between our two countries, including expanding market access for American businesses into China and increasing Chinese investment into our industries. Leaders from many of the United States’ largest companies joined a portion of the meeting. The Presidents also highlighted the need to build on progress in ending the flow of fentanyl precursors into the United States, as well as increasing Chinese purchases of American agricultural products. The two sides agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to support the free flow of energy. President Xi also made clear China’s opposition to the militarization of the Strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use, and he expressed interest in purchasing more American oil to reduce China’s dependence on the Strait in the future. Both countries agreed that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.

Xi also raised Taiwan, in stark language but nothing particularly new:

Xi stressed that the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-U.S. relations. Handled well, the overall stability of the bilateral relationship can be maintained. Handled poorly, the two countries will collide or even come into conflict, pushing the entire China-U.S. relationship into a very dangerous situation. “Taiwan independence” and peace across the Taiwan Strait are mutually exclusive, like fire and water. Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is the greatest common ground between China and the United States, and the U.S. side must handle the Taiwan question with the utmost prudence.

习近平强调，台湾问题是中美关系中最重要的问题。处理好了，两国关系就能保持总体稳定。处理不好，两国就会碰撞甚至冲突，将整个中美关系推向十分危险的境地。”台独”与台海和平水火不容，维护台海和平稳定是中美双方最大公约数，美方务必慎之又慎处理台湾问题。

Treasury Secretary Bessent told CNBC in an interview that President Trump would have more to say about Taiwan:

KERNEN: So many times I’ve, and this will be the final question. I know you got to run, Mr. Secretary. But you have so many different hats. I’m going to ask you, it’s kind of a Treasury, kind of a secretary of war question, I guess. Will Taiwan come up? Do you know whether President Xi is going to ask President Trump to change the long-standing strategic ambiguity? Or will there be any requests from President Xi to limit arms sales to Taiwan at this point? Do you know? Can you comment on that at all?

BESSENT: Sure, sure, Joe. It wouldn’t be a U.S.-China summit without the Taiwan issue coming up. And I’m confident that President Trump, the, understands the issues around that and the, is very resolute the, in his answers. And I’m sure we’ll be hearing more from him in the coming days on that.

Perhaps we will hear more on Taiwan from Trump in a few hours when he talks with Sean Hannity of Fox News.

Today’s People’s Daily page one is one for history:

Today’s top items:

1. Key US-China meetings - This section includes a full translation of the readout of the Xi-Trump meeting

2. Rubio and Bessent on the talks - Secretary of State Rubio told NBC News that Taiwan “did not feature prominently” in the talks with Xi, while Secretary Bessent told CNBC that they are “going to talk about forming a board of trade for the bilateral trade between the U.S. and China. And we’re going to talk about a board of investment that will be responsible for investment in non-sensitive areas.” Bessent also said in the interview that the US and China will “set up a protocol in terms of how do we go forward with best practices for AI to make sure nonstate actors don’t get a hold of these models”. From Bessent’s comments, it kind of sounds like lots of things are not yet locked down.

3. Anthropic on competition on AI between the US and China - Anthropic has been consistent that it wants the US and its allies to lead in AI, not the Communist Party of China. Today they released a new paper on the topic titled 2028: Two scenarios for global AI leadership:

In this post, we present two scenarios for what the world might look like in 2028, when we expect transformative AI systems to have arrived.

In the first scenario, America has successfully defended its compute advantage. Policymakers have acted to tighten export controls further, disrupt China’s distillation attacks, and further accelerate democracies’ adoption of AI. In this world, democracies set the rules and norms around AI. It’s also in this scenario that we’re most likely to successfully engage with China on safety, which we’re supportive of to the extent this is possible.

In the second scenario, America has chosen not to act. Policymakers have not tightened loopholes on the CCP’s access to compute, and AI firms in China have quickly taken advantage—catching up to the frontier and even overtaking America. In this world, AI norms and rules are shaped by authoritarian regimes, and the best models enable automated repression at scale. It will be no solace that this authoritarian triumph has happened on the back of American compute.

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The late addition of Huang, with a pickup at the refueling stop in Alaska, has sparked speculation that some sort of deal for sales of more Nvidia chips to China may be on the table. Like most of the speculation about this trip, we should find out soon.

The addition of Michael Kratsios, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, to the trip is interesting for any AI discussions. He issued the memo last month about “Adversarial Distillation of American AI Models”.

Earlier today we engaged in our own speculation about the visit when we recorded this week’s episode of Sharp China - 10 Questions and Modest Expectations With Trump in China to Meet Xi Jinping:

On today’s show Andrew and Bill talk through 360 degrees of Presi…

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Show Notes:

On today's show Andrew and Bill talk through 360 degrees of President Trump's trip to Beijing this week. Topics include: Jensen Huang hitching a ride in Alaska, general expectations for deliverables after limited leaks and hurried advance planning, Trump's reception in Beijing, and the limits of "upper hand" analysis. From there: A coterie of billionaire CEOs make the trip with Trump, a US Chamber of Commerce/Rhodium report warning about the PRC's industrial strategy, and Trump makes overtures about "opening" China. At the end: Questions on Taiwan arm sales and AI cooperation, the expected talks on Ezra Jin and Jimmy Lai, a trillion dollar investment report that went viral eight months later, Xi's calculus before a 21st Party Congress, the Iran question looming over the week's meetings, and big, fat hug speculation.

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Related Readings:

Trump China visit; China’s Next Generation Industrial Policy; Standardizing and developing AI agents; No more deflation?; Ding Xuexiang visits Huawei -- Sinocism

Jensen Huang hitching a ride -- Emily Goodin on X

A weakened Trump arrives at Xi’s court -- FT

Trump on Opening China -- Truth Social

Trump is taking more than a dozen U.S. executives to China. Jensen Huang isn’t one of them -- CNBC

China expanding its industrial dominance, warns US business group -- FT

China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy -- Rhodium

Donald Trump demands Xi Jinping ‘open’ China to US business -- FT

Xi Is Poised to Press Trump on Arms Sales to Taiwan -- NYT

U.S. and China Pursue Guardrails to Stop AI Rivalry From Spiraling Into Crisis -- WSJ

Families of two Americans jailed in China urge Trump to seek their release -- Reuters

Jimmy Lai is not forgotten as Trump goes to China -- WaPo

US-China Relations Cannot Return to the Past, But Can Have a Better Future—On the Occasion of the China-US Heads of State Meeting—— - Guo Jiping -- People’s Daily (Sinocism Translation)

Is Trump About to Invite In the Biggest Predator in the World? -- NYT

Team Chyyyyyna -- Lara Trump on X

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Today’s top items:

1. Trump China visit - The PRC confirmed that President Trump will meet with Xi this week. He will arrive May 13 and depart after lunch Friday. According to the PRC, “Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump will have an in-depth exchange of views on major issues concerning China-U.S. relations and world peace and development.”

Vice Premier He Lifeng will lead a delegation to South Korea on May 12-13 to hold economic and trade consultations with Treasury Secretary Bessent. Such a meeting on the eve of the Trump-Xi summit is a sign that they are still working on deliverables for the visit. Expectations should be low for this visit, but you never know what Trump may decide to announce. I am of the view that the “China has the upper hand” takes about the upcoming Trump visit to Beijing are overblown, or at least that is not at all how the US side views the situation, but we shall know soon enough when we learn what significant, credible outcomes there are, if any.

The US continues to announce Iran-related sanctions affecting PRC firms, with the Friday entity listing of three satellite firms and today’s announcement by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) that it is “designating 12 individuals and entities for their roles enabling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) sale and shipment of Iranian oil to the People’s Republic of China.”

A small group of CEOs will join Trump in China:

I believe this is the list of CEOs invited; it is not clear all will attend. Nvidia’s CEO surprisingly did not make the cut, so that probably means there will be no deal to sell more Nvidia chips to China.

Bessent will be in Japan Tuesday and meet with Prime Minister Takaichi, but I think the Japanese are disappointed Trump is flying all the way to Asia without stopping in Tokyo given all the pressure the PRC is exerting on the country.

2. China’s Next Generation Industrial Policy - A new report, prepared for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce by the Rhodium Group, analyzes the evolution of Chinese industrial policy a decade after the “Made in China 2025” initiative. The authors argue that Beijing is entering a more systemic and pervasive phase of state intervention, shifting toward an “industrial policy of everything” that spans raw materials, mature industries, and frontier technologies like AI and quantum computing. Despite domestic fiscal constraints, the Chinese government is recentralizing resources and utilizing state-directed financing to maintain its manufacturing edge. This strategy has resulted in a “China Shock 2.0,” characterized by a massive manufacturing trade surplus and deepening global dependencies on Chinese inputs. The sources highlight that China’s growing trade dominance is often masked by price deflation, making its actual market share gains in volume even more significant than value-based data suggests. Ultimately, the report warns that the window for international policy responses is closing as China further entrenches its position in global value chains.

The report provides extensive detail on how China is actively working to bind global supply chains to its domestic manufacturing base and prevent other countries from diversifying their reliance away from China. By making alternative supply chains nearly impossible to develop, China can incentivize foreign firms to relocate production inside China, further concentrating global dependence and increasing its geopolitical leverage.

You can read the report here.

3. State Council Executive Meeting - Li Qiang chaired a State Council Executive Meeting on Saturday “to study and implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important remarks on the current economic situation and economic work, as well as his important remarks at the symposium on strengthening basic research.” Strengthening domestic circulation, expanding and upgrading the service sector, planning and construction of the “six networks” - the water network, the new power grid, the computing power network, the new-generation communications network, urban underground pipe networks, and the logistics network, and “continued advancement of risk resolution in real estate, local government debt, small and medium-sized financial institutions, and other areas”, were among the agenda items. I have posted a full translation of the readout here.

4. Standardizing and developing AI agents - On Friday the Cyberspace Administration of China, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology jointly released the “Implementation Opinions on the Standardized Application and Innovative Development of Intelligent Agents”. I have posted a translation of the document here, and a translation of the accompanying Q&A with a “relevant official from the CAC” here. That official explains why they issued the “Opinions”:

In recent years, AI agent products represented by mobile phone assistants, terminal-side intelligent stewards, and cloud-based agents have emerged at an accelerating pace, taking on the form of large-scale deployment and greatly facilitating people’s work and lives. At the same time, characteristics of AI agents such as high autonomy and elevated permissions have also brought security risks including privacy leakage, unauthorized actions, and behavioral loss-of-control. It is necessary to coordinate development and security, and to promote the standardized application and innovative development of AI agents.

答：近年来，以手机助手、终端智能管家、云端智能体等为代表的智能体产品加速涌现，呈现规模化应用态势，极大便利人们工作生活。同时，智能体高自主性、高权限等特性也带来了隐私泄露、越权操作、行为失控等安全风险，需要统筹发展与安全，促进智能体规范应用和创新发展。

The Party Central Committee and the State Council attach great importance to the development of artificial intelligence. At the 20th collective study session of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed the need to grasp the trends and laws governing AI development; to accelerate the formulation and improvement of relevant laws and regulations, policies and institutions, application standards, and ethical norms; and to build systems for technical monitoring, risk early warning, and emergency response, so as to ensure that artificial intelligence is safe, reliable, and controllable. In August 2025, the State Council issued the “Opinions on Deepening the Implementation of the ‘AI+’ Initiative,” which—focusing on areas including science and technology, industrial development, consumption upgrading, people’s livelihoods and welfare, and governance capacity—set a phased target of being the first to achieve broad and deep integration of AI with key sectors by 2027, with adoption rates for new-generation intelligent terminals, AI agents, and similar applications exceeding 70 percent.

党中央、国务院高度重视人工智能发展。习近平总书记在中共中央政治局第二十次集体学习时强调，要把握人工智能发展趋势和规律，加紧制定完善相关法律法规、政策制度、应用规范、伦理准则，构建技术监测、风险预警、应急响应体系，确保人工智能安全、可靠、可控。2025年8月，国务院印发《关于深入实施”人工智能+”行动的意见》，以科学技术、产业发展、消费提质、民生福祉、治理能力等领域为重点，提出到2027年，率先实现人工智能与重点领域广泛深度融合，新一代智能终端、智能体等应用普及率超70%的阶段性目标。

The formulation and issuance of the Implementation Opinions is a concrete measure for carrying out the “Opinions on Deepening the Implementation of the ‘AI+’ Initiative.” Oriented toward driving technological innovation, enhancing governance capacity, building an industrial ecosystem, and improving people’s livelihoods and welfare, it seeks to create a sound policy environment, leverage the demonstration effect of model use cases, and coordinate the high-quality development, high-level security, and high-efficiency governance of AI agents.

制定出台《实施意见》是贯彻落实《关于深入实施”人工智能+”行动的意见》的具体举措，以推动科技创新、提升治理能力、构建产业生态、提升民生福祉为导向，营造良好政策环境，发挥典型场景示范效应，统筹推动智能体高质量发展、高水平安全、高效能治理。

5. No more deflation? - April CPI (1.2%) and PPI (2.8%) both increased in April from a year earlier, and more than forecast. The Iran war and rising energy prices are helping end deflation, though perhaps not in the way the authorities prefer. The anti-involution campaign may also be starting to have an impact.

6. Ding Xuexiang basic research inspection tour - Last week Ding Xuexiang made an inspection tour about basic research in Fujian, Shanghai, and Beijing. This follows the April 30th symposium on strengthening basic research. According to the readout of Ding’s trip, he

pointed out that General Secretary Xi Jinping attended the symposium on strengthening basic research and delivered an important speech, issuing a call to further consolidate the foundations of building a strong country in science and technology on the new journey of the new era. We must thoroughly study and implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech, give play to the advantages of the new whole-nation system, and comprehensively raise the level of basic research and the capacity for original innovation with the perseverance and resolve of “sharpening one sword over ten years.”

Ding visited the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Huairou National Laboratory, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, CATL and Huawei’s Lianqiu Lake R&D Center. The CCTV report on Ding’s visits shows him meeting Ren Zhengfei at Huawei’s Chip Fundamental Technology Research Laboratory.

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1. Suspended death sentences for two former Defense Ministers - Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu were both sentenced to death with a two-year suspended sentence, which means they will likely spend the rest of their lives in jail. Wei was found guilty of accepting bribes and Li was found guilty of accepting bribes and offering bribes. There is no mention of to whom Li offered bribes. These are very severe sentences for such former senior officials, and probably do not bode well for Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.

Here is the brief statement from Xinhua:

On May 7, 2026, a military court issued its verdict in accordance with the law on the bribery case of Wei Fenghe, former member of the Central Military Commission and former State Councilor and Minister of National Defense. Wei Fenghe was found guilty of accepting bribes and sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, deprived of political rights for life, and ordered to forfeit all personal property. Upon expiration of the two-…

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